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PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
GRAHAM L. FRICKEt
(Part I of this article begins on page one of Volume Six.)
IV.
VENDORS' LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE
T HAS ALREADY been observed that doctrines which place in-
creased burdens on manufacturers have been developed in response
to strict liability trends and that these developments fit conveniently
with better risk-bearer theories which attempt to impose ultimate
liability on persons strategically situated to absorb and redistribute
losses. The better risk-bearer theory works fairly well in relation to
manufacturers who constitute a discrete class of potential defendants
who are very generally in a strong financial position. The main
reasons for this are that the imposition of liability on a class, being
less offensive to democratic notions, is more acceptable to judges, and
that, insofar as they do constitute a class, it is possible to reach this
result by means of express rules of law and doctrines of universal
application, which avoid the necessity for articulating policy grounds for
decisions.
It has, however, been argued"' that this justification for holding
all manufacturers liable is too facile in that it fails to discriminate
between different types of situations. It is true that the manufacturer-
jobber-retailer combination predominates. But, as the writer of the
t Lecturer in Law, University of Tasmania. LL.B., University of Melbourne;
LL.M., University of Pennsylvania.
186. Note, 37 COLUm. L. Rev. 77 (1937).
(123)
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note points out, a large amount of business is done by powerful chain
stores - the future given for 1933 was 25% of the total volume of
retail business" 7 - and this shows signs of increasing. Another
writer puts the 1939 figure at 21.7%, but he equates "chain" with
three-or-more units.' Equating a "chain" with 11 or more units,
chain stores did 20.64% of the total retail business for the first 11
months of 1957, and 21.58% for the same period of 1958."89 If we
regard the 3- or 4-or-more unit as representing a chain, the current
figure would be closer to 30%; if "voluntary" chain groups are to be
included, the figure would approach 40%. Under any definition of
chain group, the percentage is substantial. Here the financial posi-
tion of the manufacturer may be comparatively weak, and the con-
ventional policy arguments for the imposition of ultimate liability on
the manufacturer rather than on the retailer may therefore not
always hold water. Of course, most contemporary manufacturers,
however small, will have products liability insurance. But there are
some marginal manufacturers in highly competitive industries who
cannot afford the cost of premiums or who have limited insurance
coverage and for whom liability may spell insolvency. In these situa-
tions it is the retailer, not the manufacturer, who can best bear the
cost of liability.
This is merely to delineate the nature of the problem. Perhaps it
is due in part to the unwillingness of the bench to articulate the
'better risk-bearer policy. Assuming, however, that judges are going to
continue concealing the policy basis for their decisions, how can
the difference in the financial standing of various types of retailers be
incorporated into doctrine so as to produce different results on a
rational basis ?
In the area of negligence, there are various possible avenues by
which retailers' liability may be reached. Certainly the retailer may
be liable for positive conduct in relation to the good by which an
undue risk of harm is created - such as where he negligently mis-
labels a prescription or mishandles a beverage in a glass container so
as to weaken the container and increase the likelihood of explosion.
If the defect has been caused by negligence on his part, he will not
have an action over against his supplier. In such a case ultimate
liability will rest on his shoulders whether he is in the strongest
financial position in the chain of distribution or not. This is not
187. Id. at 79, n.15, citing U.S. BUREAU OP THE CENSUS, RETAIL DISTRIBUTION
25 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1935).
188. CONVERSE & HUEGY, ELEMENTS OF MARKETING 358 (3d ed rev. 1947).
189. Computed from figures obtained from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Monthly
Trade Report (Nov. 1959).
[VOL. 6: p. 123
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felt to be unjust, however, for the desirability of discouraging the
retailer and other retailers from such negligent conduct is in this
situation overriding.
A handy line of thought is suggested by some cases which deal
with liability of retailers of refrigerators, washing machines, auto-
mobiles and other complicated mechanical products. In answer to the
frequent assertion that the retailer in the modern commercial setting
merely performs the function of a "conduit," it is properly observed
that this, while true of most food products and all other products con-
tained in sealed containers, is not true of the more complicated
mechanical articles. Retailers of such articles, it is pointed out, main-
tain large inspection and pre-sales servicing departments to check on
products before letting them out into the community. It is common
practice for the manufacturer of automobiles to make specific alloca-
tion of an amount roughly representing 5 % of the price of each car for
the very purpose of compensating the retailer for repairs and other
routine checks on the roadworthiness of the car before it is sold.
Realistically, the retailer in such a situation is not a mere conduit,
and his functions of repairing, servicing and inspection are things
for which the consumer is paying. In such cases, it is easy for the
court to reach the conclusion that the retailer has "assumed" the duty
of inspection and cannot be heard to say that he should not be liable
for a defect which reasonable care in inspection would have revealed.
This line of thought will not, however, help solve the problem of
differentiating between the chain and the single retailer. Indeed this
reasoning tends to cut the other way, for the chain store system is
most frequently used for the sale of food - almost half of the volume
of business done by the 11-or-more unit chains in the figures given
below.9° was represented by food products - and seldom used for
the sale of automobiles and electrical goods.
It will later be argued that some retailers owe a minimal duty
of inspection to the consumer or others foreseeably affected by his
negligent failure to perform this duty. This much at least can be
said - the imposition of such a duty will in no way interfere with
our arguments for generally imposing ultimate liability on the manu-
facturer. Of course the retailer can only be held liable for failure to
detect defects by reasonable inspection where the defect existed when
the product reached him. In such a case he will have an action over
against his supplier for breach of warranty, in which, however, the
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Perhaps the problem of differentiating between the small corner
retailer and the chain group can best be solved by way of the war-
ranty action. Normally, the retailer will have an action over against
his supplier, and ultimate liability will be imposed on the manu-
facturer - a generally desirable result. But, by stressing the methods
of inspection undertaken by large chain groups, courts may be able to
prevent the action over in such cases, so that liability will rest with
the retailer."" Chain groups, and even "voluntary" chains - formed
by individual retailers grouping together for bargaining and freight
purposes - are very often in a dominant bargaining position and
prescribe to the manufacturer exactly what they want and even the
manner of manufacture. Sometimes such chains maintain an inspec-
tion department by which statistical samples are taken - a sample
number of cans will be opened and inspected - and some even send
a representative along to the manufacturer's factory to inspect for
defects as the products are being manufactured or as they are coming
off the assembly line. Even if it would be too much of a strain to
find an agency relationship in such cases, it is possible to argue that
by maintaining such control and by inspecting so rigorously the re-
tailer has precluded himself from complaining of any defects which
exist.
Another, though partial, solution may be found in the "trade
mark" cases, which impose liability on the distributor who has held
himself out as manufacturer or packer, by placing his brand on the
product and using national advertising to instill faith in such a brand
in the consumer population. Such reasoning may here be useful, for in
many instances chain store merchandise is sold under brands belonging
to the retailing group. It may be that by utilizing both the "waiver
by inspection and control" basis and the trademark-estoppel basis the
desired result of differentiating between differences in economic stand-
ing of various retailers may be achieved.
S ituations where warranty action against vendor
would prove inadequate.
Should it be wondered why a tort action is needed against the
vendor in view of the considerable protection provided by the warranty
action, we will now examine situations in which the warranty action
would provide negligible or inadequate protection for the victim of
the defective product and in which, therefore, legal doctrine or tactics
would dictate the bringing of an action in tort.
191. For this suggestion see 37 CoLum. L. Rev. supra note 186 at 85 n.48.
[VOL. 6: p. 123
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The statutory warranties would not protect the purchaser where:
1. he must rely on the implied warranty of merchantable quality,
but the vendor does not regularly deal in goods of that description ;9'
2. he must rely on the implied warranty of fitness, but
(a) he has used the product for an unusual purpose, and
failed to make known to the vendor the particular purpose for
which he required the goods,'9 3 or
(b) the goods were sold "under" a patent or trade
name,19 4 or
(c) in some other way the purchaser has not relied, or at
least is unable to show that he did rely, on the skill and judgment
of the vendor ;"'5
3. he has examined the goods, or even where he has simply had
an opportunity to examine them,' 96 and the defect was one which
such examination ought to have revealed" ; 9,
4. the contract contains a disclaimer clause by which the vendor
has excluded implied warranties. 9 '
In addition, the statutory warranties may not adequately protect
the purchaser where remedies for breach of such warranties have
been contractually limited, or consequential damages have been sus-
tained by the purchaser where such have been excluded or limited by
the contract. And while the difference in the tort and contract
measures of damage will rarely be significant in the sale situation,
since the courts usually hold that the vendor has notice from the
nature of the transaction that damages will exceed the value of the
article sold,' there are some situations where it is conceivable that
the choice of action would make a difference in this respect, as for
example where a person in a high-income bracket sought damages for
impairment of earning power. In such situations a delictual action
against the vendor would be preferable from the plaintiff's point of
view.
192. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15 (2).
193. Id. § 15 (1).
194. Id. § 15 (4).
195. Id. § 15 (1).
196. Bensbach v. Allied Machine & Welding Co., 334 Ill. App. 76, 78 N.E.2d
344 (1948) ; Weber v, Wright, 14 Tenn. App. 451 (1931) ; Thernett & Fehr v.
Beers, [1919] 1 K.B. 486.
197. UNIFORM SALtS ACT § 15 (3).
198. The possibility of doing this is expressly recognized in section 71 of the
Uniform Sales Act.
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The statutory warranties would not protect the victim, despite the
existence of all the foregoing elements necessary to satisfy the statutory
requirements, where he cannot satisfy the privity requirement. This
may happen where the victim is contemplating purchase but the sale
has not yet been completed ;200 where the victim is an employee of the
purchaser;2° I or even, according to some strict authorities, where
the victim is a member of the purchaser's family, but did not himself
purchase the goods.2 °2
Situations where action against manufacturer would
provide inadequate protection.
We have already seen that legal doctrines provide considerable
remedies against the manufacturer and that these doctrines are ex-
panding. For this reason the possibility of a tort action against the
vendor will often be an academic question. But this is not always true.
Sometimes it will happen that not only will the victim be unprotected
by the statutory warranties, for reasons already given, but he will
lack any adequate remedy against the manufacturer so that if there
200. Tourte v. Horton, 108 Cal. App. 22, 290 Pac. 919 (1930) (plaintiff forced
to sue vendor in tort, because defective washing machine merely supplied to her on
trial); Lasky v. Economy Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N.E.2d 305 (1946) (customer
in self-service store injured when bottle exploded before payment made at cash-
desk; the result follows logically from the contractual analysis that display is only
an invitation to treat - cf. Pharmaceutical Society v. Boots, [1953] 1 Q.B. 401 -
but appears unduly harsh) ; Santise v. Martins, Inc., 258 App. Div. 663, 17 N.Y.S.2d
741 (1940) (plaintiff injured in trying on pair of shoes with protruding nail - sale
not yet completed); cf. Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949) facts
similar to those in Lasky v. Economy Stores, supra, but court allowed plaintiff to
join vendor and manufacturer as defendants on theory that vendor's active negli-
gence may have weakened bottle; it is noteworthy that vendor, a financially strong
chain store, was a more desirable defendant than the manufacturer; cf. discussion
supra at notes 186-89; cf. also Day v. Grand Union Co., 280 App. Div. 253, 113
N.Y.S.2d 436 (1952).
201. Noble v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 12 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Wash. 1935)
(plaintiff, restaurant employee injured when steam pressure controlled by employer
caused explosion) ; Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McMath's Adm'r, 148 Ky. 265, 146
S.W. 770 (1912) (decedent, painter, killed by explosion of dryer sold to his
employer by defendant; no warning of explosive qualities on can) ; O'Donnell v.
Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 13 N.J. 319, 99 A.2d 577 (1953) (defendant supplied
vendee with clips to secure tree-trimming employees, including plaintiff, when
working).
202. Connor v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 25 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Mo.
1939) (wife and sister-in-law of purchaser injured by bad meat); Cleary v. First
Nat'l Stores, 291 Mass. 172, (1935) (wife of purchaser injured by defective canned
cocoa) ; Brussels v. Grand Union Co., 187 Atl. 582 (N.J. 1936) (son of purchaser
injured by defective canned peas). There are many other cases denying recovery
to members of the vendee's family collected in DICKERSON, PRODUCTs LIABILITY
AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 63 n.1 (1951). Other courts have been more lenient
frequently allowing the case to go to the jury on the question of agency, especially
where the husband has been injured. See DICKERSON, supra at 66 n.5. The Uniform
Commercial Code makes the limited amelioration of extending the vendor's warranty
to members of the purchaser's family and guests of the purchaser injured by a
defect in the product, remaining neutral as to situations beyond these relationships,
preferring not to "enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the
seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the
distributive chain." See, UNIWORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, especially comment 3.
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is no possibility of a tort action against the vendor the victim will
be without a remedy. This may happen where:
1. the manufacturer is undiscoverable, 03 or inaccessible;
2. the manufacturer is out of the jurisdiction ;204
3. it is at least possible that the defect was introduced into the
product after the product left the hands of the manufacturer ;215
4. action against the manufacturer is precluded by a statute of
limitations ;211
5. the manufacturer is insolvent.0 7
It should be obvious from this discussion that there are a number
of situations where the possibility of a tort action against the vendor
will assume considerable practical importance. In some of these situa-
tions the absence of such an action will mean that the victim of the
defective product is left without a remedy. In others, while a con-
current action may exist against the vendor for breach of warranty, or
against the manufacturer in negligence or for breach of warranty,
there may nevertheless be tactical or practical financial reasons for
preferring to sue the vendor in tort.
There is no doubt, as we have already observed,208 that a vendor
can be held liable for positive acts of negligence, such as negligent
compounding, labeling or handling, in relation to the goods. Two
writers have joined issue on the question whether the retailer may be
203. Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932) (dis-
tributor placed his trademark on cans of meat without indicating who the manu-
facturer was) ; Walker v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 131 Texas 57, 112
S.W.2d 170 (1938) (can of corn injuring buyer so labeled as to conceal manu-
facturer's identity; note against judicial readiness to impose liability on powerful
chain store; cf. comments supra note 200) ; Degueveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co.,
231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336 (1936) (similar).
204. Burkhardt v. Armour, supra note 203 (packer and first purchaser in
Argentina, distributor in Chicago, retailer in Connecticut). The manufacturer will
often stand behind the retailer when the latter is sued in the interest of maintaining
good relations with his vendee; where he does not do so voluntarily the "vouching
in" letter may offer a solution; cf. Part I, 6 VILL. L. R~v. 2-3, notes 5 & 6. This is
open, however, to the following comments; (a) the manufacturer may refuse to
comply with the suggestion made in the letter, and if he does so refuse, some
courts do not regard the matter as having been concluded by the first suit, so that
a new suit may have to be commenced; (b) in any case, whether this step is
taken or not depends upon the retailer; the plaintiff cannot initiate such a proce-
dure. Some manufacturers have taken advantage of this position by setting up
separate wholesale companies in each state (e.g. Goodyear tires). Recent Supreme
Court decisions giving a broad interpretation to "minimum contacts" for the purpose
of states' jurisdiction over foreign corporations, e.g., McGee v. Int'l Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), may render such devices ineffective.
205. E.g., Reiss v. Kirkman & Sons, Inc., 242 App. Div. 77, 273 N.Y. Supp.
7 (1934).
206. Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933).
207. Even where the manufacturer is not actually insolvent, he may be in a
weaker financial position than the vendor, and it may be preferable to sue the latter.
Cf. text accompanying notes 186-189.
208. Text at notes 189, 190.
WINTER 1960-61 ]
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sued for mere omission to inspect for defects.2 °9 Professor Eldredge
says that he cannot, relying on the ancient distinction between mis-
feasance and nonfeasance. But affirmative duties are often, as Eldredge
admits, imposed as the price of a benefit, and it is difficult to see why
the sale situation cannot be classified as one containing a benefit to
the occupier justifying his liability to invitees.
The following position will be taken in this discussion:
1. Professor Farage has the better argument on the authorities,
which warrant the conclusion that a vendor may in appropriate cases be
held liable for failure to inspect for defects.
2. (a) This duty is of limited scope, normally obliging the vendor
to do no more than make a visual inspection for defects;
(b) there is, however, no hard and fast rule that the vendor
can never be held liable for a defect unless it could have
been discovered by ocular inspection.
3. The duty of the vendor to test and inspect for defects is cer-
tainly less stringent than the duty of the manufacturer.
4. The existence of certain features, such as the case of detection,
the position of the vendor in the commercial structure and the tradi-
tional functions he exercises in the particular kind of business, may
predispose courts into finding that a duty exists.
There are many authorities which superficially support Eldredge
in that they deny recovery to plaintiffs. But Farage has argued
convincingly"' that the basis for these decisions is that defendant
complied with his reasonable-care duty of inspection, rather than that
he had no duty to inspect. Many of the cases are expressly decided on
this basis,2 ' and the facts of such cases give us no reason for not
209. Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability 89 U. PA. L. REv. 306 (1941); Farage,
Must a Vendor Inspect Chattels Before Their Sale? - An Answer, 45 DICK. L. Rev.
159 (1941) ; Eldredge, Vendor's "Duty" to Inspect Chattels - A Reply, 45 DICK.
L. Rev. 269 (1941) ; Farage, Vendor's Duty to Inspect Chattels - A Rejoinder, 45
DICK. L. Rnv. 282 (1941).
210. Farage, supra note 209.
211. Noble v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 12 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Wash. 1935)
("The complaint does not allege as against the seller . . . that such dangerous
condition, if any, was known or should have been known to the seller, nor that the
seller in any way failed to exercise good faith and fair dealing.") ; Stone v. Van
Noy R.R. News Co., 153 Ky. 240, 244, 154 S.W. 1092, 1094 (1913) ("[T]he
uncontradicted facts leave no doubt that plaintiff's injury so far as the News Com-
pany is concerned was the result of an accident which ordinary prudence on its
part could not have guarded against.") ; Flaccomio v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 374, 100
Atl. 510, 513 (1916) ("[T]here is not the slightest evidence to show that Sonneborn
or his agents knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care could have known that it
[whiskey] contained wood alcohol.") ; Giberti v. Barrett Mfg. Co., 266 Mass. 70, 73,
165 N.E. 19, 20 (1929) ("Unless the defendant knew, or ought to have known, that
boilers with bottoms soldered but not riveted together were unsafe, it could not
be found to be negligent in supplying them."); Barrango v. Hinckley Rendering
[VOL. 6: p. 123
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taking the courts at their word. There are, it is true, some cases
decided in the plaintiff's favor, where the court simply says that the
defendant was unaware of the defect.212 It is submitted that there is
no justification for drawing special significance from such statements,
as the courts in these cases were simply not adverting to the possibility
of an action for breach of duty to make a reasonable inspection - a
possibility which in the cases in question was probably not argued,
being untenable on the facts.
The strongest affirmative support for the view that the vendor
is under a duty to inspect for defects is provided by the case of
Ebbert v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 213 which was decided by a four
to one majority of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and which has
withstood challenge for the last twenty years.2 14 The plaintiff had
purchased an electrically driven washing machine which contained a
wringer equipped with a release bar. The plaintiff was injured when
the release bar failed to operate, leaving her fingers caught between the
rollers of the wringer. In an action brought in negligence and breach
of warranty, the jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff's favor. This
judgment was affirmed on appeal to the Superior Court. Defendant
appealed further to the supreme court, citing, inter alia, West v.
Emanuel.215 The court distinguished the West case as a sealed package
case stating, "While not differing with the trial court and the
Superior Court in basing defendant's liability on breach of warranty,
we think an equally solid basis for recovery is defendant's inadequate
performance of the duty of inspection and demonstration. ' 216
The reliance placed by the lower courts on the express warranty,
which amounted merely to a promise to replace defective parts, seems
untenable, but it should here be noted that the supreme court is not
lending positive support to this basis, but merely saying that it does
"not differ" with this view.
It should also be noted that the same court, with a slight change
in personnel, stated a similar proposition in Coralknick v. Abbotts
Dairies :217 "The limit of its [defendant's] duty was to provide against
Co., 230 Mass. 93, 94, 119 N.E. 746 (1918) "[lIt does not appear how or when the
needle became embedded in it [a bar of soap], or that the defendant knew of its
presence before delivering it to the plaintiff or could have known of it by the
exercise of reasonable diligence."); Kusick v. Thorndike, 224 Mass. 413, 414, 112
N.E. 1025, 1026 (1916) (no liability "unless it be shown that he [defendant] knew
or ought to have known" of danger).
212. E.g., Belcher v. Goff Bros., 145 Va. 448, 134 S.E. 588 (1926).
213.330 Pa. 257, 196 Atl. 323 (1938).
214. Since it was decided, Ebbert has been cited forty times in various courts
and in no case which cites it has the decision been in any way questioned.
215. 198 Pa. 180, 47 Atl. 965 (1900).
216. 330 Pa. 257, 268-69, 196 Atl. 323, 329 (1938).
217. 337 Pa. 344, 11 A.2d 143 (1940).
WINTER 1960-61 ]
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defects discernible upon reasonable inspection and to handle the bottles
with reasonable care. 218
Of the more recent cases which support the view that vendor owes
a duty to inspect, Witt Ice & Gas Co. v. Bedway,s19 provides strong
support, at least in relation to the sale of used articles. That was an
action by a barman to redress injuries sustained when the defective
regulator of a beer keg, which had been sold to his employer by the
defendant, caused the keg to explode. After quoting from the opinion
in the Ebbert case, the court stated:
If the regulator were a new one the tests to which it was
submitted would doubtless have been adequate to divulge any
latent defects, but the jury apparently found that it was not a
new regulator and as we have heretofore pointed out there was
sufficient evidence to sustain that finding. Inasmuch as it was
not a new mechanism and the explosion occurred we think it is
self-evident that the tests to which it was subjected were not
adequate to bring to light any latent defects .... We think it may
reasonably be inferred from all the facts that the defect was one
which a reasonably prudent dealer should have discovered before
placing it upon the market and delivering it to a customer.2 °
In that part of the opinion relies on the fact that appellant dealt
both in new and in used regulators, and had sold the article as new,
it might, however, be said that this case is not authority for imposing
a duty to inspect on retailers who deal exclusively in new articles.
It is worthwhile to compare the Witt case with a recent English
case22 ' dealing with the liability of a used car dealer. The transfer
from the defendant to the plaintiff was effected by means of a tripartite
hire-purchase arrangement in which a finance company acted as in-
termediary. The plaintiff sued for damages for injuries resulting from
an accident caused by a defect in the steering mechanism, bringing his
action in breach of warranty and in negligence. The negligence
argument was, of course, that the defendant "knew, or ought to have
known" of the defective condition of the steering wheel. Sitting in
the Queens Bench Division without a jury, Judge McNair accepted
the express warranty argument, but went on to say:
Though this conclusion is sufficient to dispose of this action
in the plaintiff's favor, it is right that I should also state my views
upon the second, ground of complaint, namely, negligence. In
Herschtal v. Stewart & Ardern, Ltd.,222 Tucker J. held that motor
218. Id. at 345, 11 A.2d at 144.
219. 72 Ariz. 152, 231 P.2d 952 (1951).
220. Id. at 156-57, 231 P.2d at 954-55.
221. Andrews v. Hopkinson, [1957] 1 Q.B. 229.
222. [1940] 1 K.B. 155 (footnote by court renumbered).
[VOL. 6: p. 123
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dealers who supplied for the plaintiff's use on hire purchase terms a
car which they themselves had repaired, were liable to the plaintiff
for personal injuries which he suffered when the near rear wheel of
the car came off owing to faulty workmanship on the part of the
defendant motor dealer's staff in the reconditioning of the car....
Though in Herschtal's case the negligence relied upon was negli-
gence in actually effecting the repair, I see no reason why the
motor dealer in the absence of such reasonable anticipation should
not equally be held liable if he puts into circulation in the hands
of his customer a motor-car which is in fact in a dangerous
condition when the defect rendering the condition dangerous
consists of a defect which could and ought to have been dis-
covered by reasonable diligence on his part.22 3
There are some American cases224 which contain similar hold-
ings - some even provide extensions in that they allow recovery to
injured pedestrians 2 5 but almost all seem limited to the situation
where the dealer has assumed the function of reconditioning the car
sold. The recent case of Thrash v., U-Drive-It Co.,220 however, ap-
pears to impose liability when the car was not sold as a reconditioned
car. In that case plaintiff was injured while riding in a defective
truck sold to plaintiff's father by one of the defendants, who had in
turn purchased the truck from the second defendant. The plaintiff
sued both defendants alleging that the lock on the left front wheel
did not fit the rim, and that it was negligent for both defendants to
have failed to detect such a defect. The trial court had instructed the
jury to return a verdict for both defendants, but the appellate court,
while it had affirmed the judgment in relation to the second defendant,
had remanded the action against the immediate dealer for a new trial.
On further appeal, the court again affirmed the judgment for the
second defendant on the basis that an intervening agency had broken
the chain of causation and absolved the second defendants from
liability. In dealing with the first defendant, however, the court com-
mented that "Although a dealer in used motor vehicles is not an
insurer of the vehicles he sells, he is generally under a duty to ex-
ercise reasonable care in making an examination thereof to discover
defects therein which would make them dangerous to users or to those
223. [1957] 1 Q.B. 229, 236.
224. Egan Chevrolet 1 o. v. Bruner, 102 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1939); Banker v.
Packard Motor Co., 297 I1. App. 645 (1938) ; Kothe v. Tysdale, 233 Minn. 163,
46 N.W.2d 233 (1951) ; McClead v. Holt Motor Co., 208 Minn. 473, 294 N.W. 479(1940); Bock v. Truck & Tractor Inc., 18 Wash. 2d 458, 139 P.2d 706 (1943).
The principle expressed in most of these cases is, however, a wider one ignoring the
reconditioning factor.
225. E.g., Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.V. 855 (1928).
226. 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419 (1953).
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who might come in contact with them, and upon discovery to correct
these defects or at least give warning to the purchaser.227
Of the more recent cases, Chitty v. Horne-Wilson, Inc., 228 seems
to rely strongly upon the express representations of safety, so that
it does not support the inspection-duty very strongly, but Williams v.
Oklahoma Tire & Supply Co.,229 while it also contains frequent as-
surances of safety, does not appear to rely on these in reaching its
decision; the court talks of a breach having been committed before any
express assurances were made, and it would seem that it would have
made no difference in the eyes of the court if the explosion of the stove
had occurred immediately after the stove was delivered and before any
complaints or assurances were made:
The defendant did not know whether the stove was in a
safe condition for use when it was delivered to Redick because,
notwithstanding it had been transported in some manner from
somewhere to Hot Springs, the defendant did not even casually
inspect it to ascertain whether the stove would leak fuel or
whether it was in proper alignment or do anything than an
ordinarily prudent dealer would have done.
The Redicks had the right to expect the defendant to use
ordinary care to inspect and to deliver to them a stove suitable
for the purpose for which they were purchasing it. The stove did
not function properly and the cause of the mal-function could
have been discovered by a reasonable inspection by an ordinarily
competent dealer. This duty of inspection was owed by the
defendant to the Redicks and it failed to make such inspection
notwithstanding instructions from the manufacturer it was
usually necessary to make an inspection and test the stove to
determine whether or not it had been abused in transportation
and whether all parts were in proper alignment. . . . The stove
. . . was subject to inspection for such imperfections as might be
discovered by the exercise of the care, skill and experience of an
ordinarily competent dealer in stoves of that kind."'
It is submitted that these cases, quite apart from the support
they derive from a line of New York cases shortly to be discussed,
justify the first point in the position taken above, that the vendor may
in appropriate cases be held liable for failure to inspect for defects
Most of the cases alleged to offset the effect of these authorities
are concerned with defects which would have been extremely difficult
to detect, and appear to be decided on the basis that, conceding a duty
227. Id. at 473-74, 110 N.E.2d at 423.
228. 92 Ga. App. 716, 89 S.E.2d 816 (1955).
229. 85 F. Supp. 260 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
230. Id. at 267-68.
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of inspection in vendors, that duty was not in the circumstances of
the case breached. Far from militating against the view in the above
collection of cases, these cases lend indirect support to the view that
there is a duty of inspection by their very language. There are very
few cases which directly contradict this view; most of them are old,
and in any event it is doubtful if they do have this effect when properly
construed.
The second point, that the vendor's inspection duty is a narrow
one, is related to the first in that it explains why there are few cases
decided in the plaintiff's favor on this basis.23 ' The narrowness de-
rives partly from the vendor's position in the marketing structure - in
many products, such as food in sealed containers, he is merely a con-
duit and can neither detect the defect by ocular inspection nor test the
contents without rendering the product unsaleable. The application of
the standard of reasonable care to a person in such a situation is not
likely to create a very onerous duty. But even if the defect is one
which is visible or detectable by such simple tests as reasonable pru-
dence would dictate, it may be so obvious that the buyer cannot com-
plain of it. There are few defects which are obvious enough to be
detectable in the exercise of reasonable care by a person in the re-
tailer's position, yet not so obvious that the buyer will be regarded as
having assumed the risk which such defects present. Practically, such
defects will be limited to those which the peculiar position of the
retailer - including his experience or his opportunity to observe
handling the goods - places him in a better position to detect than the
average customer, or those belonging to complicated mechanical in-
struments which may more conveniently be tested by the dealer than
the average customer.
The New York cases, while they recognize the existence of a duty
to inspect, place an arbitrary limitation on such duty, confining it
to "defects which may be found by inspection alone," as distinguished
from dangers so concealed that mechanical tests are needed to disclose
them. This rule,232 while it represents the normal limit of the vendor's
obligation, is objectionable when stated as an inflexible limitation.
Furthermore, it would seem to be inconsistent with the factual result
reached in some of the cases which announce it.
231. Cf. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 70 (1951):
"For the injured consumer, the negligence action against the retailer is small con-
solation. The successful plaintiff is comparatively rare."
232. This is referred to by Fleming James Jr. as "a better rule" - preferable,
that is, to the rule which categorically denies any obligation in the vendor to
inspect; James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. Rlv. 192, 219 (1955).
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The first of the New York cases was Garvey v. Namm,233 in which
plaintiff, while washing a flannel wrapper bought from the defendants,
sustained injury from a large basting needle contained in the wrapper.
The trial court accepted the defendant's evidence that an inspection had
been made, but found that such inspection had not been made with
ordinary care, having been of the most cursory character. Accordingly
judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court affirmed this judgment, endorsing the
view that a vendor is under a duty to inspect for defects. In dealing
with two other cases, however, the court drew a distinction which
has subsequently been taken to represent a rigid limitation on the
vendor's duty to inspect. The distinction is drawn in the following
passages:
[Defendant cites] Bruckel v. Milhau's Sons, 116 App. Div. 832.
In that case, however, the injurious defect in the article sold by
the druggist was not one that was patent and visible on mere
inspection. It could have been discovered only by a mechanical
test of the article. It was held by this court that a druggist
selling articles on consignment was not obliged, in the exercise
of ordinary care, to undertake mechanical tests to ascertain a
latent defect, such as would not have been apparent on ordinary
inspection. I think there is a very substantial difference in the
facts in both cases.
The defendant further cited the decision of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin in Hasbrouck v. Armour Co., 139 Wis. 357,
121 N.W. 157. In that case the defendant had manufactured
toilet soap and placed it on the market for sale. A purchaser and
user of one of the cakes of the toilet soap was injured by reason
of the fact that there was imbedded in the cake of toilet soap
a needle. . . . Its presence in the cake would not have been dis-
covered by any ordinary examination. It was held that the
presence of the needle in the cake of toilet soap would not in
itself indicate a lack of ordinary care on the part of the defendant
in putting the cake of toilet soap on the market for sale. Here,
again, there is an obvious difference between the facts. In the
case at bar, it would appear that the needle in question was a
basting needle, and that it was sticking in an unfinished seam of the
garment. If the garment had been examined with ordinary care
before it was delivered to the plaintiff, the presence of this
needle should have been discovered.234
The first step in the process of crystallization was taken in
Santise v. Martins, Inc., 235 the second of the New York cases to
233. 136 App. Div. 815, 121 N.Y. Supp. 442 (1910).
234. Id. at 816-17, 121 N.Y. Supp. 443-44.
235. 17 N.Y.S.2d 741, 258 App. Div. 663 (1940).
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impose a duty of inspection. There, action was brought by a person
who was injured by a nail protruding from the inner sole of a shoe
being tried on in the defendant's department store. The Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court allowed an appeal by the plaintiff, on
the basis of a failure to satisfy the duty of inspection. Referring to
Garvey v. Namm, the court indicated its interpretation of the dis-
tinction drawn in that case as setting the limits of the vendor's duty:
"The extent of that duty is made clear in the opinion. It required the
seller to discover defects which may be found by inspection alone, as
distinguished from dangers so concealed that mechanical tests are
needed to disclose them. Inspection would have revealed the danger
here, and the defendant is liable for its omission."2'0
This interpretation is questionable. A more likely reading of the
Garvey case is that the court was merely distinguishing cases cited by
defendant's counsel, and the observations that the defect in one of
those cases could have been discovered only by a mechanical test was
made merely to emphasize that reasonable care in that case would not
have revealed the defect, It was not meant to erect a categorical dis-
tinction. Be that as it may, the obiter limitation stated in the Santise
case was acted upon two years later in Heggblom v. Wanamaker,23 7
a case concerning the sale by the defendants of a rubber exercising
device which broke causing injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, not
being in privity with the defendants, brought his action in negligence,
but was unsuccessful since the defect was not discoverable "by in-
spection alone."
The third case which follows this line is the recent one of
Workstel v. Stern Bros. 23 8 In that case the plaintiff, having sustained
injuries when a bed he had purchased from the defendant collapsed,
sued the dealer for breach of warranty and negligence, and the manu-
facturer in negligence. He succeeded in each claim, but as to the
negligence of the vendor the court said:
As to the theory of negligence, the Court is of the opinion
that the defective condition of the bed should have been readily
discoverable by the defendant Stern Brothers by inspection alone.
The defendant affixed the legs to the bed and at such time it could
have inspected the bed to ascertain the nature and quality of its
construction and whether it could support the weight of a person
without collapsing.1
3
236. Id. at 743, 258 App. Div. 665-66.
237. 178 Misc. 792, 36 N.Y.S.2d 777 (1942).
238. 3 Misc. 2d 858, 156 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1956).
239. Id. at 860, 156 N.Y.S.2d 337.
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In support of this New York rule, it may be that, in light of
normal business expectations, the case will be a rare one in which it
could be suggested that the vendor in addition to making an ocular
inspection ought also to have carried out some tests to determine the
soundness of the article. But this merely justifies the framing of a
working rule that the reasonable care standard will normally be satisfied
by ocular inspection. Is there any justification for making the normal
rule an arbitrary limitation on recovery? It is submitted that such an
arbitrary limitation represents an unfortunate premature rigidity.
While the rule may be satisfactory as a working rule - we see a
reasonable application of it in the Ringstad case,24 where the court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendant vendors should
have tested the material in a cocktail robe sold to the plaintiff for
resistance to flame or heat - but room should be left for allowing
recovery for failure to test in an appropriate case. In the Ringstad
case, the court did not state the proposition as an inflexible rule, but
said that "the general rule is that there is no obligation on the re-
tailer to make such a test in the absence of some circumstances sug-
gesting the necessity therefor." '241
That reasonable care on the part of the retailer may under some
circumstances dictate some kind of testing beyond mere visual in-
spection of the goods should be clear from an analysis of certain cases
already discussed. In the Andrews case 242 the fact that the defect
could only have been detected by conducting a test of jacking up the
car and pulling on the ball pin did not prevent recovery. Similarly, in
the Ebbert case243 the defect in the release bar of the wringer could
not have been observed "by inspection alone." It would have been
necessary to operate the machine in order to discover the defect. The
same may be said of the Witt case.244 Indeed, where any complicated
mechanical device is concerned - and it is most likely, for reasons
to be discussed below2 4 that these problems will arise in the context
of sales of such devices - it is highly improbable that defects will
be detectable by simply looking at the article.
But even more significant is the decision on its facts of one of
the New York cases, Workstel v. Stern Bros.246 It is true that the
240. Ringstad v. I. Mangin & Co. 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952).
241. Id. at 926, 239 P.2d at 850. (Emphasis supplied.)
242. See text supra at notes 221-23.
243. See text supra at notes 213-16.
244. See text supra at notes 219-20.
245. It is mainly the importance of the factor of superior competence and ex-
perience of the vendor which is most prominent in such cases; see discussion in
text, infra at notes 272-77.
246. See text supra at notes 238-39.
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court in that case paid lip services to the Garvey-Santise limitation,
but how is it possible to "ascertain whether a bed could support the
weight of a person without collapsing" by "inspection alone"? Some
simple test would surely be necessary.
Let us now compare the vendor's inspection duty with the manu-
facturer's inspection duty. The manufacturer will not only be liable for
negligence in manufacture but will be liable for failure to make a
reasonable inspection for defects after manufacture, where the injury-
causing defect was discoverable in the exercise of reasonable care.
Because we have concluded that the vendor is also under a reasonable-
care duty of inspection, it should not be assumed that the duties of
the two functionaries are coincident. The criterion of reasonable
care is constant, but the application of that criterion to each person
will result in duties of different content. This is because their functions
and positions in the marketing process differ widely. The manu-
facturer, being in the business of making such products, will be held at
least to the standard of the industry and will be required to keep pace
with new developments and increasing knowledge of his processes. The
expertise which long experience in manufacturing these items ought to
have developed should put him in an excellent position to know what
to look for and what tests to make. In addition, it is usually most
economical for the manufacturer, rather than the retailer or dis-
tributor, to make such tests. He is concerned with large quantities of
such products over a long period of time and the initial cost of in-
stalling machinery for testing for defects will be spread over many,
many items. If the product is to be sold in a sealed container, tests
may be made before packaging. It is therefore clear that the manu-
facturer is in a very strategic position to make such extensive tests
of his products. The application of the reasonable care standard to
a person in such a position may even require the use of modern testing
devices, such as electronic equipment. But when one compares the
position of the retailer whose stock in any one item is limited, and
who cannot unseal packages without ruining his chances of reselling
them, it is obvious that reasonable care as applied to him will place
far less onerous inspection demands on him.
Take, for example, the MacPherson case.247 There the defend-
ants were held liable for failure to make an adequate inspection or
test of a wheel bought from another and incorporated into a car made
by them and ultimately sold to the plaintiff. The degree of inspection
247. MacPherson v. Buick Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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and testing required of an automobile manufacturer was discussed by
the Appellate Division:
If the defendant had purchased its wheels unpainted, a wood
expert would have been a great assistance in determining the
quality of the wood used. If it purchased the wheel painted,
some of the paint could have been removed, the wheel could have
been weighed, and an expert could have formed some judgment
as to the quality of the wood used. There is some evidence of
other tests, and it must be there is some way of determining the
quality of the wood in such a wheel; if not, it must be negligence
to purchase a wheel in such a forward state of construction that
it is impossible to determine what it is made of."'2 48
It will be seen that the tests required were quite stringent, and
liability was imposed for failure to make such tests. This does not
mean that a vendor who failed to undertake such tests would be held
liable to the injured consumer. This is made clear in the case of
Shroder v. Barrpn-Dady Motor Co.,2 41 where the court, despite the
fact that it accepted the view that a vendor is under a duty to inspect
for defects,25° refused to hold a motor car dealer liable for a defect
which was more readily detectable than the defect in the MacPherson
case: "We therefore hold that the evidence fails to show any facts
out of which there could arise a duty of such unusual inspection as
taking off the wheels of this car to determine the kind of grease used
on the wheel bearings; that reasonable care under the circumstances
shown did not require it; and that plaintiff has failed to show any
actionable negligence on the part of the defendant." ''
The present point is neatly illustrated in two cases where action
was brought against both vendor and manufacturer, in each instance
for failure to inspect for defects. In that these cases concede the
existence of a duty of inspection in both vendor and manufacturer,
yet hold only the manutfacturer for breach of such duty, they clearly
show that the inspection-duties of each functionary are not identical.
In Washburn Storage Co. v. General Motors Corp., 2 plaintiff had
alleged that the proximate cause of his injuries was the failure of each
defendant to make a reasonable inspection, since a reasonable inspection
would have revealed to both the existence of a pitted groove across
248. 160 App. Div. 55, 59, 145 N.Y. Supp, 462 (1914) ; per Kellogg J.
249. 111 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. 1937).
250. Id. at 71: "It is true, of course, that defendant, receiving new cars from
the manufacturer, had some duty of inspection before selling them, and it should be
charged with knowledge of what such inspection, as due care required, would dis-
close."
251. Id. at 72.
252. 90 Ga. App. 380 (1954).
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the top of the axle, which caused the axle to break and led to plain-
tiff's injuries. Dealing with the action against the dealer, the court
was of opinion that the petition did not set forth a cause of action:
"We are further of the opinion that in such a situation the law does
not require a dealer to examine the vehicle to such an extent as to
require the dealer to discover such a defect in the axle as the petition
alleges."2 ' On the other hand the court found no difficulty in holding
that a manufacturer is liable for an injury "caused by such a defect
as is alleged in the instant petition.
254
Again, in Zesch v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia,255 action was
brought against both vendor and manufacturer for negligent failure
to make proper tests to ascertain defects. Plaintiff was an employee who
used an abrasive cutting off wheel bought by his employers from the
second defendants and manufactured by the first defendants. A flaw
in the wheel caused the plaintiff personal injuries. Once again, the
court differentiated between the inspection-duties of vendor and manu-
facturer.
Defendant-respondent, Production Tool and Supply Com-
pany, a vendor, could not have discovered the flaw by an exterior
inspection, or by a test by sounding, and there was nothing shown
in the evidence which should have caused a vendor to have realized
that the wheel was unsafe for use. Defendant-respondent had no
duty, under the facts, to subject the wheel to a rigid inspection
or test for a latent flaw. Shroder v. Barron-Dady Motor Co.,
supra; Vol. II, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Comment a,.
sec. 402.25'
Compare the holding in relation to the manufacturer:
. . . given an article which may contain a latent imperfection
making the article reasonably certain to be a thing of danger
(though it is carefully manufactured), where it is shown that
the imperfection could be disclosed by a test, it would seem
reasonable that the manufacturer in the exercise of ordinary care
would be under a duty to make the test.
We cannot follow the argument of the defendant-appellant
that the plaintiff-respondent's case must fail because there was no
evidence that defendant-appellant, or other manufacturers of
abrasive wheels, possessed the necessary equipment to perform the
test. The necessary equipment for such a test would require no
more that the installation of an instrumentality which would
operate the wheel at the necessary high rate of speed.257
253. Id. at 385. (Emphasis supplied.)
254. Id. at 386.
255. 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W.2d 140 (1944).
256. Id. at 564.
257. Id. at 567.
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Thus the suggestion that the vendor will be liable for breach of a
reasonable-care duty of inspection should cause no alarm, for it would
not require him to install the expensive testing devices which reason-
able care may call for in the case of the manufacturer.
Characteristics affecting duty of inspection.
There has been little sustained treatment of the vendor's inspec-
tion-duty. Occasionally, however, the courts have made observations
which provide clues as to what facts will determine the existence and
extent of this duty. It is submitted that the following will predispose
a court to find that a duty exists or that the duty has not been ful-
filled:
(1) special danger involved;
(2) ease of detection;
(3) "assumption" of duty, inferred from the maintenance of
sales and service departments;
(4) the position of the vendor in'the marketing structure of such
products. This includes: (a) a de facto inquiry into what is normal in
such trade, and will be affected by the degree of compilation
of the product in question, and the likelihood that a defect may have
supervened during shipment from manufacturer and will therefore
require attention before it is sold;
(b) the special competence of the vendor derived from his ex-
perience, or
(c) his special opportunities to detect defects which put him in a
position superior to that of the customer in respect of the particular
kind of defect being complained of.
Special danger involved.
Professor Fleming James., Jr. has suggested a public policy justifi-
cation for imposing a duty of inspection in a passage in which he
answers Professor Eldredge's objection that such a duty would im-
pose an unreasonable burden on vendors. The retailer, he observes,
can generally pass the burden of liability back to his supplier.
Moreover he is better situated than the consumer to do this.
And if these considerations are sufficient to justify the burden of
strict liability within the magically capricious circle of privity, they
certainly are enough to call for a high standard of care towards
plaintiffs who are outside privity but well within the class of
people likely to be hurt by the enterprise by the retailer and
maker. In his fear of pinning blame on those who have done
nothing morally wrong, Eldredge fails to see the real incidence of
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liability in modern setting and that the problem is increasingly
one of fair and efficient administration of inevitable losses, rather
than moral shortcoming of a nominal defendant.258
Many important doctrines of the law had their genesis in pub-
lic policy considerations259 and it seems fairly clear that such
considerations have played their part in creating pressures to impose
a duty of inspection on the vendor of defective goods. If this is true,
then one should not be surprised to find the duty imposed most
readily in situations where defective products constitute an extreme
danger. There is perhaps an analogy in the food cases in the war-
ranty field. And, indeed, one does not have to look far in cases which
have imposed liability for passages which stress the danger of the
defective product, implying that their decision, by reinforcing other
legal sanctions, will encourage precautions and conduce to greater
safety.
In the important Ebbert decision, the court did not hesitate to
articulate these views:
The public safety and security against the fatal or injurious con-
sequences of negligence in demonstrating and testing mechanical
devices for common public use and in which lurk obvious possi-
bilities of danger is a consideration to which courts cannot be
indifferent. An imperative social duty requires the imposition
of an inspection-duty. 260
These words were quoted in the Witt case, which imposes liability
on the vendor of second hand articles for failure to detect reasonably
discernible defects, at least where the article is represented as being a
new one.
261
When we turn to the main English case on the subject,2 62 we
find a similar emphasis: "Having regard to the extreme peril involved
in allowing an old car with a defective mechanism to be used on the
road, I have no hesitation in holding that the defendant in the cir-
cumstances was guilty of negligence in failing to make the necessary
examinatior, or at least in failing to warn the plaintiff that no such
examination had been carried out."
-2 6 3
258. Note, Products Liability, 34 TSXAs L. Rev. 192, 219, n.166 (1955); Cf.
Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CALin. L. Rpv. 614, 625, n.45 (1955).
259. Cf. Part I, 6 ViLL. L. Rv. 36-37 (1960).
260. 330 Pa. 257, 198 At. 323 (1938).
261. Supra notes 219-220.
262. Andrews v. Hopkinson, [1957] 1 Q.B. 229; supra notes 221-223.
263. Id. at 237.
WINTER 1960-61]
21
Fricke: Personal Injury Damages in Products Liability
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Ease of detection.
In the Ebbert case reliance was also placed upon the fact that the
defect could easily have been detected. As the court put it, "An
imperative social duty requires a vendor of a mechanical device to,
take at least such easily available precautions as are reasonably likely
to prevent serious injury to those who by using such a device may
be exposed to dangers arising from its defective construction."2 4
Similarly, Judge McNair stressed detection in deciding for the
plaintiff in the Andrews case: "On the evidence given before me I am
satisfied . . . (4) that this defective condition could have been dis-
covered by any competent mechanic (though probably not by an
ordinary owner-driver) without stripping down the steering mechan-
ism, by the simple and recognized method of manually pulling upon
the ball pin after jacking up the car for examination."26
Compare his later words: "There was before me abundant evi-
dence that in the case of an old car such as this the danger spot is the
steering mechanism and that this particular defect could have been
discovered by a competent mechanic if the car had been jacked up."26
Assumption of duty.
There is another factor which the court emphasizes in the Ebbert
case which may prove useful in imposing liability on vendors whose
function is not that of a mere conduit in the marketing chain, but
who do in fact exercise and are paid for exercising a function of ser-
vincing and inspection. The factor stressed was the assumption of duty
which could be spelled out from all the facts of the case.
[The defendant] took upon itself the duty of subjecting the
wringer to "inspection and tests" before selling. It is a legiti-
mate inference that the cost of such inspection and test was
added to the price of the equipment. Defendant's director of ap-
pliance sales testified: "We have service men to take care of
appliances, something over 100 of them, but they take care of
all appliances, refrigerators, washers and all." We must assume
that the work of these service men, i.e. testing and demon-
strating appliances is essential work, that their salaries and wages
are absorbed in the purchase price and that therefore a pur-
chaser having paid the vendor for these tests and demonstrations,
has a right to recover from the vendor for injuries resulting
from inadequately tested machines the latter sold. To the ques-
tion propounded: "Had defendant a duty to inspect the article for
264. 330 Pa. 257, 265, 198 AtI. 323, 327 (1938).
265. [1957] 1 Q.B. 229, 234.
266. Id. at 236-37.
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defects?" the answer is: "The defendant assumed this duty and
was paid for discharging it.267
There seems to be involved here some idea of quid pro quo, as
well as a notion of reasonable business expectations derived from
normal practices. The obverse side of this notion would be represented
by such cases as Outwater v. Miller,26 8 where it was said that one
does not reasonably expect a wholesaler to unpack every package
passing through his hands and examine it. And when the court in
Ebbert came to discuss the sealed package cases, it observed signifi-
cantly: "The purchaser in such cases does not expect any such pre-
caution to be taken and relies wholly upon the integrity, good faith
and care of the person who put the food in the cans. '2 9
Position of retailer - normal practice and nature of article.
This factor is related to the last. Retailers of automobiles, re-
frigerators, washing machines and other complicated mechanical de-
vices generally maintain service and repair departments to correct
defects which may have occurred in transit, and to make realignments
and adjustments before the product is finally sent out to be used by
the consumer. Under the "assumption" doctrine of the Ebbert case he
will in such cases be liable for failure to detect reasonably discernible
defects. Perhaps the likelihood of a defect supervening after the
product has left the manufacturer is so high even the retailer who did
not maintain a servicing and inspection department for such prod-
ucts would be held to be negligent. His function is quite different
from the retailer of food and sealed packages. Unlike the latter, he is
in many respects in a more strategic position to make checks and
adjustments than the manufacturer, since his is the last stage before
use. The result then is as it should be. He may find the maintenance
of a servicing and inspection department uneconomical, but most
manufacturers would refuse to deal with a retailer who refused to
establish such a department where complicated products are concerned.
And when he complies with the pressure of the manufacturer and
normal usage, he will be liable under the Ebbert doctrine for failure to
detect reasonably discernible defects. He will probably have an action
over against his supplier, who in any case will normally stand
behind him for sound business reasons.
267. 330 Pa. 257, 265, 198 At. 323, 327 (1938).
268. 155 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1956).
269. 330 Pa. 257, 264, 198 At. 323, 327 (1938).
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In this connection, the federal court's attitude to the dealer who
failed to inspect in the Williams case'" should be recalled. The prod-
uct the court was concerned with in that case was a stove. As the
court said:
The defendant did not know whether the stove was in a safe
condition for use when it was delivered to Redick because not-
withstanding it had been transported in some manner from some-
where to Hot Springs, the defendant did not even casually in-
spect it to ascertain whether the stove would leak fuel or whether
it was in proper alignment or do anything that an ordinarily
prudent dealer would have done.2"'
Position of retailer - special competence and opportunity
to discover defects.
It was pointed out earlier27 2 that one of the limiting factors of
the vendor's duty is the purchaser's duty to look out for himself;
this was one of the points at issue between Professors Farage and
Eldredge, the latter maintaining that if the defect was obvious enough
for the vendor to have been in a position to detect it, then the purchaser
should also have seen it.
273
Professor Farage's answer, that the duties of the vendor and
purchaser to inspect may not be identical, leads us to consider why
the duty of the vendor should be more stringent than that of the
purchaser. What is there in the situation of sale which justifies
holding the vendor liable for failing to detect a defect which the
purchaser failed to detect for himself? The 1934 Restatement of
Torts provided the answer that the dealer has both superior ex-
perience and superior opportunity to enable him to detect defects:
[The vendor] may, however, as dealer, have a special oppor-
tunity to know of circumstances, which to his experience as a
dealer, would indicate that the goods are likely to have de-
teriorated, as when he knows that goods, subject to deterioration
by lapse of time, have been long kept in stock. If such is the
case, he is subject to the same liability as though he knew of
their defective character if he does not exercise reasonable care
to inform the purchaser of the chance that the goods may have
deteriorated. A retail or wholesale vendor may, in the cursory
inspection which he gives to the goods while handling them for
the purpose of receiving and selling them, or during the periodi-
cal taking of stock, have an opportunity to observe indications
270. Supra notes 229-230.
271. 85 F. Supp. 260, 267-68 (1949).
,272. See text accompanying notes 232-33 supra.
273. See references, note 209 supra.,
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which as a competent dealer in such commodities should cause
him to realize that the goods are or are likely to be in a condition
dangerous for use. These indications may be so slight that the
vendor is not entitled to expect that they will be observed by any
inspection which customers make or should make before buying
and using goods. Even if the indications are plainly observable
by the customer they may be such that, although enough to cause
a competent dealer to realize that they make or are likely to make
the goods unsafe, they may convey no such intimation to a cus-
tomer having no special experience with such goods. The rule
stated in this Section requires the retail or wholesale dealer to
utilize not only the special opportunities which he has to observe
the condition of the goods but also the special competence which,
he, as a dealer in such goods, should have to realize the dan-
gerous implication of conditions which though observable by the
customer are not likely to be appreciated by him.
274
The rule which such considerations justified, imposing a limited
duty of inspection where the vendor failed to utilize the peculiar oppor-
tunity and competence which as a dealer he should have had,275 finds
support in some of the cases. A general discussion is contained in the
case of Shroder v. Barron-Dady Motor Co.:276
It is true, of course, that defendant, receiving new cars
from the manufacturer, has some duty of inspection before selling
them, and it should be charged with knowledge of what such
inspection, as due care required, would disclose. Defendant, as a
dealer in motor cars, and its employees, were familiar with the
construction and operation of the cars made by the manufacturer
whose products it sold. Its duty as to inspection . . . would no
doubt be greater than that of an ordinary retail merchant in the
examination of less complicated articles of merchandise. This
duty would undoubtedly require them to observe the cars as they
received and operated them to see if they did operate properly, to
investigate the cause of any unusual condition apparent to them,
and also to investigate the condition of and check the operation of
parts or appliances, which they might reasonably expect (as a
result of their experience and knowledge of these cars) would
need attention before being delivered to purchasers.277
274. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 402, comment (1934).
275. Cf. 65 C.J.S. NXCLIG5NC5 § 100 c.(2) (b) n.51.
276. 111 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. 1937).
277. Id. at 71.
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V.
VENDORS' LIABILITY IN WARRANTY
Section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act.reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in
that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the
quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied
under a contract to sell or sale, except as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods
are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer
or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a
seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.
(3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no im-
plied warranty as regards defects which such examination ought
to have revealed.
(4) In the case of a contract to sell or sale of a specified
article under its patent or other trade name, there is no implied
warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose.
(5) An implied warranty or condition as to the quality or
fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by the usage of
trade.
(6) An express warranty or condition does not negative a
warranty or condition implied under this act unless inconsistent
therewith.27
In that Williston's draft represents an almost verbatim tran-
scription of Chalmer's 1893 drafting of the English Sale of Goods
Act provision, which in turn represents Chalmer's sedulous endeavour
to enshrine the common law position which had developed during the
preceding century, there is special justification for undertaking an
historical survey.
278. UNr'ORM SALES AcT § 15.
[VOL., 6: p. 123
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More than 40 years ago, Judge Augustus Hand suggested that
consumer protection could more efficiently be achieved by means of
administrative control than by private action:
My own feeling is that protection to the public lies not so
much in extending the absolute liability of individuals, as in
regulating lines of business in which the public has a particular
interest in such a way as reasonably to insure its safety. In other
words, pure food laws, and rigorous inspection of meats, canning
factories, and other sources of food supply, would seem to me a
much more effective way of protecting the public than by the
imposition of the liability of an insurer upon those who furnish
food. The former method corrects the evil at its source. The
latter method only imposes an obligation in cases which ex
hypothesi cannot be guarded against by the individual by the
exercise of due care. It shifts the loss from the person immediately
suffering lhe injury to a person who has neglected no precaution in
supplying the food. This certainly is not in accord with the
general tet;dencies of the common law. I am inclined to think that
the imposition of such an obligation would tend to lead in the
long run to the prosecution of unfounded claims, rather than
to the protection of individuals or the public. 2 79
In saying this, Judge Hand foreshadowed the modern development
of many administrative regulations affecting food, drugs and other
commodities, but the striking thing about this "modern" development
is that it really represents a retrogression to the Middle Ages. Hamil-
ton has shown2 80 that the modern paternalist philosophy is not new,
but existed in the Middle Ages of England in the form of guilds and
other state supervision. In that authoritarian era, merchants were
punished for selling sub-standard goods. Various assizes, going back
as far as 1256,281 were policed by "overseers" employed to visit shops
and markets to inspect for breaches of regulations. These regulations
were preventive rather than remedial and did not inure for the benefit
of the individual consumer. Hamilton describes the early position in
order to develop his thesis, reflected in the ironic title of the article,
that do :,rines of caveat emptor were judicial innovations in the nine-
teenth century.
279. Valeri v. Pullman Co., 218 Fed. 519, 521-22 (1914); cf. Williams, The
Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRNT LEGAL PROBLEMS 137, 170 (1951).
280. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YAL4 L.J. 1133 (1931).
281. Id. at 1142, n. 34.
WINTER 1960-61 ]
27
Fricke: Personal Injury Damages in Products Liability
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
(b) later history.
In section III of this article the idea was developed that legal
doctrines are reflections of the prevailing ideological climate.2 82 An
excellent example of the close relationship of these phenomena is
provided by the development of the law of warranties. When the
philosophical climate changed during the eighteenth century to that
of laissez faire, the courts were equal to the challenge. But the ethos
of the legal profession required that an appearance of continuity be pre-
served. As Hamilton well puts it: "[The common law] has usually been
administered as if it were exclusive, and as if its current interpretation
had always prevailed. It has, accordingly, rested its decrees upon
reason, natural justice, and enlightened public policy, and has claimed
for even its novelties the authority of established precedent."28
As with all sociological developments, the evidence is not all one
way and matters are not so clear-cut as some pursuing an academic
inquiry would wish. Some judges are in advance of their time, others
are conservative and seek to resist current forces. The frontier spirit
of the United States tends to preserve individualism and retard more
recent developments so that English and American developments can-
not always be summed up in one comprehensive statement. Neverthe-
less the general outlines are clear.
Adam Smith's nascent laissez faire philosophy saw its counter-
part in the law in a slowly developing "creed of judicial laissez faire."2 4
According to this creed, the buyer was a fool if he didn't extract
from the vendor an express warranty ;215 the requirement of intention
to warrant was emphasized; courts were reluctant to read anything
into the parties' agreement which had not been expressly stated; and
a "sporting view" was taken of dealings - if the seller was sharp
enough to induce a sale by vague suggestions, good luck to him.
During the early nineteenth century in England, and the latter
part of the nineteenth century in the United States, the philosophical
climate began to undergo a gradual change in emphasis which was to
culminate in today's paternalist philosophy. This presented a challenge
to the judicial technique - the preceding era, in a desire to clothe
282. See 6 VILL. L. REv. 34-47, 34-36 (1960).
283. Hamilton, supra note 280 at 1163-64.
284. Id. at 1181.
285. Cf. McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 60 (Pa. 1839), per Ginson, C.J.:
"[F]or not to have exacted a direct engagement, had he desired to buy on the
vendor's judgment, must be accounted an instance of folly .. "; cf. also Seixas v.
Woods, 2 Caines 48, 54 (N.Y. 1804), Thompson, J.: "[T]his doctrine [of caveat
emptor] . . . is best calculated to excite that caution and attention which all
prudent men ought to observe in making their contracts. "; and cf. Parkinson v.
Lee, 2 East 314, 321, 102 Eng. Rep 389, 392 (K.B. 1802).
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the caveat emptor philosophy with the respectability of antiquity, had
"protested too much," and frequent assertions that the law had
"always been" as stated were somewhat embarrassing for those who
would now change it. The way in which nineteenth century judges
met this challenge, while it represents commendable technique, was
to leave some unfortunate legacies for the present century.
Their method involved a resort to the parties' intentions. They
were, they asserted, merely spelling out the parties' intentions, simply
articulating what the parties would have said if they had been asked at
the time of contracting. They took the entirely defensible semantic
position that words have no inherent meaning, but take their meaning
from ordinary usage and acceptation. In commercial dealings this
meant that a description of goods was to be given content by examining
the meaning ordinarily accepted in the trade. Such usage was part of
the understanding of the parties.
An important case in early nineteenth century England was
Gardiner v. Gray,2"' which concerned an executory contract for the
sale of "waste silk" to be imported from the continent. The silk
actually delivered was found to be much inferior to that in samples
previously shown the purchaser. In that there had been no mention
of the samples in the sale note, the court was not prepared to treat the
transaction as a sale by sample, but this was not the purchaser's only
hope. According to the court,
[T]he purchaser has a right to expect a saleable article answering
the description in the contract. Without any particular warranty
this is an implied term in every such contract. Where there is no
opportunity to inspect the commodity, the maxim of caveat
emptor does not apply. He cannot without a warranty insist
that it shall be of any particular quality or fineness, but the inten-
tion of both parties must be taken to be, that it shall be saleable
in the market under the denomination mentioned in the contract
between them. The purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to
lay them on a dunghill2 8 7
Some sixty years later one judge was still insisting that all courts
were doing in imposing implied warranties of quality was filling out the
agreement of the parties. As Justice Brett put it in Randall v. Newson,
In all [cases] it seems to us, it is either assumed or expressly
stated, that the fundamental undertaking is, that the article offered
or delivered shall answer the description of it contained in the
286. 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815).
287. Id. at 145, 171 Eng. Rep. 47. (Emphasis added.)
WINTER 1960-61 ]
29
Fricke: Personal Injury Damages in Products Liability
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
contract.28 8 That rule comprises all the others.... The governing
principle, therefore, is that the thing offered and delivered under
a contract of purchase and sale must answer the description of it
which is contained in words in the contract, or which would be so
contained if the contract were accurately drawn out.2" 9
The consensual theory, however, was proving to be just the thin
edge of the wedge as courts began to implement the nascent policy
of protecting consumers by pouring new content in to the words
"merchantable quality." Despite the early insistence in Gardiner v.
Gray,29 ° that the purchaser "cannot without a warranty insist that the
[article] shall be of any particular quality or fineness," the warranty of
merchantable quality was beginning to import some concept of a
minimum objective standard. Originally thought of simply as a
standard of customary usage, the warranty of merchantable quality
came to require successively that the goods should be of such a quality
as to pass without objection in the trade under the description used in
the contract, that they should be suitable for the primary purposes for
which such goods are used, and that they should be free from defects. 9 '
Another landmark case, decided in 1829, is Jones v. Bright.2 2
In that case the defendants, who manufactured copper, agreed to
supply the plaintiff with copper for the purpose of sheathing his ship.
When the copper supplied corroded after an unusually short time, the
plaintiff sued his supplier for breach of implied warranty. The develop-
ment of the law in the fourteen years which had elapsed since Gardiner
v. Gray298 is reflected in the statement of the court: "The law, then,
resolves itself into this; - that if a man sells generally, he undertakes
that the article sold is fit for some purpose; if he sells it for a particular
purpose, he undertakes that it shall be fit for that particular purpose. 2 94
It is important to note that the decision for the plaintiff was in-
fluenced in some measure by the prevailing commercial milieu in
which the manufacturer was frequently also vendor. In such a case it
Was easier to import a requirement of compliance with some minimum
standard, since it was felt that the vendor was probably at fault in his
capacity of manufacturer in having let the defect into the goods.
288. These are the court's italics.
289. [1877] 2 Q.B.D. 102, 109. (Emphasis added.)
290. 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815).
291. Prosser has discussed at length the various meanings of the phrase "mer-
chantable quality" in his article, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27
MINN. L. Riv. 117 (1943); the Uniform Commercial Code spells these out in
section 2-314(2) (a)- (f).
292. 5 Bing. 533, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (C.P. 1829).
293. 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815).
294. 5 Bing. 533, 546, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167, 1173 (C.P. 1829).
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Express mention of this factor was made in Jones v. Bright: "[B]y
providing proper materials, a merchant may guard against defects in
manufactured articles; as he who manufactures copper may, by due
care, prevent the introduction of too much oxygen." '95
It seems fair to say that the court felt easier about imposing
liability on the vendor in that the vendor had probably been negligent
in manufacture anyway. Many earlier American decisions refused to
impose liability on sellers who were not also manufacturers. 298  In-
deed it was felt necessary to remove any doubt that may have lingered
even in 1907 by using express words in the Uniform Sales Act, viz.,
both warranties apply "whether [the seller] be the grower or manu-
facturer or not."
Operation of the warranty provisions today.
At the outset of this article 2 7 the relative merits of legislation
and judicial development as methods of protecting injured consumers
were discussed, and one of the reasons assigned for preferring the
latter was the thought that legislation is relatively less flexible and
less sensitive to the quickly changing social mores involved in this
subject. It is submitted that the proof of the pudding is provided by the
inadequacy of the Sale of Goods legislation in today's setting. Here
we have an 1893 codification of 19th century sales law which was still,
at that stage, in transition, designed to suit a different age, and a
statement which has as its basic premise a proposition of caveat
emptor,2 98 being strained to suit an age which has a different com-
mercial structure and different ideas as to the relative worth of
security and freedom of enterprise. When it operates effectively, it
does so only at the expense of normal and sensible canons of inter-
pretations.
In the first place, it is clear that the earlier cases 99 were concerned
with mercantile losses rather than the problem of accident compensation
295. Id. at 544, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1172 (C.P. 1829); cf. Bierman v. City Mills
Co., 151 N.Y. 482, 487, 45 N.E. 856, 857 (1897) (also action against a manu-
facturer-vendor; "[T]hese defects resulted from improper processes of manu-
facture.").
296. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 233 (rev. ed. 1948) ; cf. Prosser, supra 291 at 146-47.
297. Part I, 6 VILL. L. Rv. 7-9 (1960).
298. UNIFORM SALS AcT § 15: "Subject to the provisions of this act and of
any statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality
or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a
sale, except as follows ......
299. Allan v. Lake, 18 Q.B. 560, 118 Eng. Rep. 212 (K.B. 1852) (sale of
"Skerving's swede turnip seed"; whether seed delivered conformed to description);
Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (C.P. 1829) (see text at notes
292-295 supra); Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815);
Leing v. Fidgeon, 6 Taunt. 108, 128 Eng. Rep. 974 (C.P. 1815) (agreement to
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for personal injuries :300 the rules they developed were appropriate for
actions between dealers who were suing for the difference in value
between the sub-standard goods which had actually been delivered and
those which the contract, interpreted in the light of normal commer-
cial usage, required. They are not appropriate for the modern prob-
lem which mass-production creates of compensating the consumer for
injuries caused by some defect in the goods. No better example of this
ineptness could be provided than the case of Henry v. Rudge & Guenzel
Co.,"0' where plaintiff sought damages for severe personal injuries
caused by a defective heel in shoes which she had purchased from the
defendant. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, however, she had com-
plained to the defendants and accepted a new pair of shoes. This the
court regarded as effective rescission which, according to the court's
construction of section 69(1) of the Uniform Sales Act as an ex-
haustive and mutually exclusive list of remedies, precluded a subse-
quent action for damages: "Having rescinded the contract, plaintiff
has no right of action for damages for breach of the warranty. She
cannot rescind and claim damages for breach of the warranty.
30 2
Another example of this ineptness is provided by the practice of
many large retailers of using a statement of minimal express war-
ranties (usually repair and replacement of parts circumscribed by
other requirements) and a statement that the written agreement is to
constitute the sum total of the parties' understanding, in combination
sell "scarlet cuttings" evidence of mercantile usage, and accepted meaning of scarlet
cuttings in the trade; the court also showed concern at the possible effect the
resale of the goods delivered would have on plaintiff-trader's commercial reputation).
300. Cf. Prosser, supra note 291 at 128, n.61; cf. also Comment, 32 TtxAs L,
Rtv. 557, 566 (1954) : "Historically, implied warranties were dealer's remedies, and
only later was protection extended to consumers"; the early meaning of merchantable
quality as such as would pass in the trade under that description (see Prosser, supra
note 291) shows that the courts were then more concerned with mercantile losses.
Cf. A Note on the Civil Remedies of Injured Consumers, 1 LAW & CONTMP. PROB.
67, 70 (1933).
301. 118 Neb. 260, 224 N.W. 294 (1929).
302. Id. at 264, 224 N.W. at 296 (1929); section 69 (1) of the Uniform Sales
Act reads: "(1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer may,
at his election:
(a) Accept or keep the goods and set up against the seller, the breach of war-
ranty by way of recoupment in diminution or extinction of the price;
(b) Accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for
damages for the breach of warranty.
(c) Refuse to accept the goods, if the property has not passed, and maintain an
action against the seller for damages for the breach of warranty;
(d) Rescind the contract to sell or the sale and refuse to receive the goods
or if the goods have already been received, return them or offer to return them
to the seller and recover the price or any part thereof which has been paid."
In Russo v. Hochschild Kohn & Co., 184 Md. 462, 41 A.2d 600 (1945), the
court reached the opposite result to that reached in the Henry case, by emphasizing
section 70: "Nothing in this act shall affect the right of the buyer or the seller to
recover interest or special damages in any case where by law interest or special
damages may be recoverable, or to recover money paid where the consideration for
the payment of it has failed."
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with the parol evidence rule, in order to withdraw from purchasers
rights which would otherwise exist, while at the same time creating
an appearance of generosity. In fact, the whole of the Uniform Sales
Act, with its talk of conformity to sample, passing of property,
negotiable documents of title, instalment delivery, liens and rescission,
and its "normal rule" for damages in Section 69(7), is geared to the
problem of mercantile losses, with which the cases in the nineteenth
century were mainly concerned. Professor James has said:
Where injuries are caused by dangerous products, the princi-
pal source of strict liability is the law of warranty, which did
not develop primarily, if at all, as an attempt to solve the problem
of accidental injuries. Rather, it grew as a branch of the law
of commercial transactions and was primarily aimed at controlling
the commercial aspects of these transactions. The shape it took
and the limitations put on it were dictated mainly by considera-
tions pertinent to the commercial relationship between buyer and
seller, and are not necessarily rational attributes of the strict
liability approach to the accident problem, to which the law of
warranty was extended collaterally.3"3
It was only in the third decade of this century when the accident
problem began to loom large that courts were led to give an extended
meaning to the phrase "merchantable quality," saying that it was not
enough that goods would pass in the first instance on their appearance,
with all defects concealed; they must be marketable with their true
character known. "Merchantable does not mean that the thing is
saleable in the market simply because it looks all right; it is not mer-
chantable in that event if it has defects unfitting it for its only proper
use but not apparent on ordinary examination. ' 30 4
We have already seen305 how in the early development of the law
of implied warranties the judges justified their position by insisting
that they were simply spelling out what the parties had actually agreed
to, but had not bothered to write out in full. Later, during this
303. James, Products Liability, 34 TFxAs L. Rgv. 192, 193 (1955).
304. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd., [1936] A.C. 85, 105 (P.C. 1935)
(Austl.) ; cf. Young v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 15 F. Supp. 1018 (W.D.
Pa. 1936) ; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931) ;
Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190 (1936) ; Morelli v. Fitch, [1928] 2
K.B. 636. Cf. also Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd., [1933] 50 CoMMw.
L.R. 387, 418, per Dixon, J.: "The condition that the goods are of merchantable
quality requires that they should be in such an actual state that a buyer fully
acquainted with the facts and, therefore, knowing what hidden defects exists and
not being limited to their apparent condition would buy them without abatement of
price obtainable for such goods if in reasonably sound order and condition and
without special terms."
305. See text accompanying notes 284-289, and notes 287-289 supra; this technique
was, of course, necessary to overcome earlier caveat emptor authority.
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century,30 6 the courts were able to recognize "implied" warranties
for what they were - obligations imposed upon vendors as a matter of
public policy, independent of any intention to agree upon their terms
as a matter of fact - but the damage had already been done. The
consensual theory had dictated, as a logical corollary, the proposition
that implied warranties could be contractually excluded by the parties.50°
The judges, insofar as it lies within their power, have given the
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act an indulgent interpretation so
as to adapt them to modern needs. They have readily inferred a
communication of the buyer's purpose, taking the view that where a
product causes injury because it is not fit for one of the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used, the buyer should not be re-
quired to show that he told the dealer of his purpose. 8' They have with
equal readiness inferred the buyer's reliance on the seller's skill or
judgment, saying that such an inference can normally be shown from
the fact that the buyer has chosen the seller's place of business in the
confidence that the latter has selected his stock with skill and judg-
ment. 09 They have construed the words "by description" almost to
the point of meaninglessness, holding that this requirement is even
satisfied in the case of a sale from an automatic vending machine.31 0
They have poured new content into the words "merchantable
306. Little v. G. E. Van Syckle & Co., 115 Mich. 480, 73 N.W. 554 (1898);
Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216, N.W. 790 (1927); Linn. v. Radio Center
Delicatessen, 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1939); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Wirtz,
15 N.D. 477, 107 N.W. 1078 (1906).
307. The ability of the parties to contract out of implied warranties was
recognized at an early stage of English law, e.g. Shepherd v. Kain, 5 B. & Aid.
240, 106 Eng. Rep. 1180 (K.B. 1821) and Baglehole v. Walters, 3 Camp. 154,
170 Eng. Rep. 1338 (K.B. 1811), and is today reflected in section 71 of the
Uniform Sales Act.
308. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931);
Landers v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 172 Ore. 116, 139 P.2d 788 (1943); Grant v.
Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd., [1936] A.C. 85 (P.C. 1935) (Austl.).
309. Grant v. Autralian Knitting Mills, Ltd., [1936] A.C. 85, 99 (P.C. 1935)
(Austl.); cf. Kurriss v. Conrad & Co., 312 Mass. 670, 679 46 N.E.2d 12, 17-18(1942), and many cases on sales of canned food, e.g. Ward v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 93, 120 N.E. 225, 226 (1918).
310. In Mead v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440, 442, 108 N.E.2d
757, 758 (1952) there is the briefest discussion on this point: "The sale here was of
a bottled beverage by description. It was a sale of goods by a trade-name .. .
describing a particular beverage." Prosser, supra note 291 at 145, observed gen-
erally: "Since dealer sales are almost non-existent in which words of description do
not appear, it would seem that the proper statement is not that the warranty cannot
exist on specific sales, but that when such sales Are made by the dealer it is the
normal accompaniment." Footnote 169, which appears after the word "appear" in
the quoted text, contains the striking suggestion that even the situation where the
customer points to an article and says, "Give me thatl" is a sale by description
giving rise to the warranty of merchantable quality. The Mead case suggests that
the predicted impact of self-service sales on the warranty of merchantable quality
will be minimal. See Note, 1 LAW & CONTM P. PRoB. 67, 69 (1933). Section 2-314
of the Uniform Commercial Code has done a service to the respectability of the
law by eliminating this "requirement."
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quality,"31' and they have been liberal on the question of damages.31 2
They have given such an interpretation to the patent or trade name
proviso that it can never cut down the warranty-creating provision on
which it is supposed to operate. 13 Finally they have leaned over back-
ward to prevent disclaimer clauses from having the effect intended. 14
These decisions may be functionally commendable, but as an
exercise in the literal interpretation of statutes they are absurd. They
do nothing to foster public esteem for the law. Moreover they repre-
sent the absolute limits within which judges may operate in con-
struing language. They still leave considerable gaps.
One such gap is the requirement of privity, which in this context
produces great hardship. As Professor James has so well expressed it:
Perhaps such a limitation corresponds to the reasonable ex-
pectations of commercial buyers and sellers when they are con-
cerned with trade losses. But where commodities are dangerous
to life and health, society's interest transcends that of protecting
reasonable business expectations. It extends to minimizing the
danger to consumers and putting the burden of their losses on
those who best can minimize the danger and distribute equitably
the losses that do occur. And since the warranties involved in
these cases do not represent the expressed or implied-in-fact
intent of bargainers, but are warranties imposed by law as vehicles
of social policy, the courts should extend them as far as the
relevant social policy requires.3"
In similar vein Professor James has discussed the reliance re-
quirement in today's setting:
An insistence on reliance is natural enough in shaping a
remedy for trade losses in commercial transactions. A cardinal
311. See text accompanying notes 291, 304 supra.
312. E.g. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
313. Cf. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 37 CoLuM. L. Rzv.
341, 363 (1937): "[Rabel] had thought we would not have section 15 (4) unless
we had meant by it something which needed saying."; and cf. Hudson, Book Review,
ATIYAH, SALA or GOODS (1957). 22 MODERN L. Rv. 109, 110 (1959): "[T]he
interpretation placed on this provision in Baldry v. Marshall [1925] 1 K.B. 260 has in
effect already reduced it to usefulness for, as explained by Bankes, L.J., at 266-67,
it is only to operate when the buyer places no reliance on the skill and judgment of
the seller by expressly requesting goods under a trade name - a case which would
seem in any case not to fall within the main provisions of the subsection and to
require no proviso."
314. The examples of this are legion. Perhaps the best is Bekkevold v. Potts,
173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927), where the contract of sale contained a provi-
sion that "No warranties have been made in reference to the said motor vehicle
by the seller to the buyer unless expressly written hereon," and no warranty had
been written on the contract. The court nonetheless held that the implied war-
ranty, being a "child of the law" was not excluded. The English courts have re-
vealed a public policy rather than a consenual attitude to implied warranties
in their construction of disclaimer clauses which mention "warranties" but fail to
refer to "conditions"; see, e.g., Wallis v. Pratt, [1911] A.C. 394.
315. James, Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. REv. 192, 193 (1955).
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aim of contract and commercial law is to assure a man of the
fulfillment of reasonable expectations induced by the apparently
promissory conduct of another. In such a context, questions of
reliance come very near to the heart of the matter. Expectations
are born of reliance. Moreover, in an age of individualism it is
natural that the buyer's opportunities for effective self-reliance
might still defeat his recoveries against the seller.
In the field of physical injuries, on the other hand, strict liability
is imposed upon an actor because his conduct involves the likeli-
hood of physical harm and it is felt that requiring him to bear
the cost of the casualties of his enterprise is just and expedient.
In this context, reliance plays a much less significant role. Tort
liability is imposed daily in a vast number of cases wherein reliance
plays no part at all. The owner of a truck 'does not invite the
public to use the roads in reliance on the care and skill of his'
driver,316 yet he will be strictly accountable for his driver's de-
faults. Nor does a landowner invite people to acquire or retain
land near his in reliance on his ability to confine dangerous sub-
stances or animals within his borders. 317
The rules of the Sales Act represent the law of an age which
protected industry with doctrines such as that of common employment
and lacked any scheme of compensation for injured workmen such
as we have today. Such rules operate capriciously in the context of
actions for compensation for personal injuries. It is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that these rules are long overdue for an overhaul.
316. The quotation is from BATY, VICARIOUs LIABILITY 11 (1916).
317. James, supra note 315 at 201-02.
[VOL. 6: p. 123
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1961], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss2/1
